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CEO Turnover, Firm Performance, and Enterprise Reform in China:
Evidence from New Micro Data
Section 1: Introduction
Executive turnover and its link to firm performance have been the focus of a large and growing literature since they provide a crucial measure of how effective a firm solves the two sets of principal-agent problems it faces: (i) diverging interests between top management and shareholders, which may result in managerial entrenchment; and (ii) diverging interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders, which may lead to the expropriation of the latter by the former or "tunneling," as referred to in the literature. 1 Specifically, tying the personal fortune of top executives to the performance of the firm aligns the interests of the shareholders and those of the management. It also breaks up the "insider" alliance between the controlling shareholder and the management and therefore helps protect the interests of outside investors (or minority shareholders). As such, executive turnover-performance sensitivities can serve as an important indicator of how well the corporate governance system functions.
In this paper, we study such link of executive turnover to firm performance in Chinese listed firms and provide the first systematic evidence on the turnover-performance sensitivities of Chinese top executives. By now a large literature has been developed on executive turnover, mostly on U.S. firms and increasingly on firms in other industrialized countries as well. 2 There is, however, relatively limited evidence on developing and transitional economies. 3 In particular, no turnover-performance sensitivity estimate is available for China, which is presently the largest 3 into how the two types of agency problems play out in a transitional economy where state control of listed firms is still paramount.
Specifically, using 1998 to 2002 financial and accounting data on China's listed firms, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, We find consistently for all performance measures including both stock return and various accounting measures that: (i) overall, CEO turnover is significantly (statistically) and inversely related to firm performance though the magnitude of the relationship is modest; (ii) perhaps more importantly CEO turnover-performance link is stronger when the percentage of company shares owned by the largest shareholder is larger. In addition, insofar as stock performance is concerned, (iii) the link between firm performance and CEO turnover is found to be stronger for privately-controlled listed firms than for state-controlled listed firms; (iv) the appointment of independent directors enhances the link between firm performance and CEO turnover; (v) the listing suspension mechanism, i.e., the ST designation, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency appears to be effective in improving the link between firm performance and turnover; and (vi) listed firms with CEOs who also hold positions in the controlling shareholders have weaker link of CEO turnover to performance.
Our findings appear to paint a mixed picture of China's corporate governance. Overall, CEO turnover-performance sensitivities in China's listed firms are found to be statistically significant yet economically still unimportant. The sensitivities of CEO turnover to firm performance are especially weak for listed firms still controlled by the state and with a relatively weak controlling shareholder. However, the substantially stronger stock performance-turnover link observed in privately controlled firms suggests that a speed-up of the privatization process in
China will lead to further improvement in its corporate governance, confirming the benefits from 4 privatization. 7 In addition, a few specific measures adopted by the Chinese Securities
Regulatory Commission (the CSRC hereafter) seem effective in strengthening the stock performance-turnover tie. Both the introduction of the ST designation and independent directors are found to boost the link between stock performance and CEO turnover. Thus to the extent that such link indicates better corporate governance, these CSRC measures have seen some success in enhancing the disciplinary functions of the stock market.
More broadly, these findings are consistent with the agency literature, especially the hypothesis developed and tested in the "law and finance" approach to corporate governance that weak protection for outside investors leads to poor corporate governance (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer 1999, and La Porta et al. 2000) . In particular, the presence of a large controlling shareholder is found to strengthen the link of CEO turnover to firm performance, while the lack of independent directors and the presence of a CEO who simultaneously holds a position in the controlling shareholder firm are both found to weaken the link. 8 These findings
provide support for the hypothesis that the second type of agency problem is particularly acute where investor protection is weak. 9 In China, where explicit protection for private property rights was not instituted in the Constitution until 1999, one would not expect the conflict between the controlling shareholder and minority outside shareholders to be resolved easily. 7 This finding is consistent with previous literature showing that SOE reforms without privatization do not help firm performance. See Shirley and Xu (2001) , for instance, for a study on the effects of performance contracts. For a discussion on the costs from delaying the privatization process in China, see for example Lardy (1998) . For specific studies suggesting the importance of ownership reform in China, see, for instance, Chang, McCall, and Wang (2003) , who find that Chinese township and village enterprises with better defined ownership have significantly better performance, and Zhang, Zhang, and Zhao (2003) find that state ownership leads to lower R&D and productive efficiency in industrial firms. In addition, Bai and et. al. (2000) explain the low profit incentives and poor performance in SOEs by the continued need for multitasking including employment provision, and findings in Bai and Xu (2005) suggest that the Chinese government may have non-financial objectives for SOEs. 8 These findings are consistent with the results in Wang, Xu, and Zhu (2004) , who find that the post-listing firm performance tends to be poor in China and the effects depend on the balance of power between top shareholders, which is potentially another proxy for the likelihood of large shareholders exploiting smaller shareholders.
9 For empirical evidence from East Asian countries that supports this hypothesis, see Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) .
In other words, the continuous difficulty faced by Chinese listed firms in solving the two types of principal-agent problems seems to be fundamentally a result of the weak protection provided by China's legal system to investors. Like many other developing countries, China does not have either a comprehensive set of legal rules that provide protection for outside investors or the ability to effectively implement existing laws that govern the operations of corporations and securities market. In addition, China's problem is further compounded by its socialist legacy. The state ownership of the majority of listed company stocks implies that the protection for even the largest investor, the state, is also weak due to the ambiguity of public property rights.
Consequently, any fundamental improvement in Chinese firms' ability to resolve the two types of principal-agent problems (or equivalently in their corporate governance) will require a broad program that encompasses not only privatization but also laws and their effective implementation to provide better protection for investors.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we will present background information on the current Chinese corporate governance system and develop testable hypotheses. The data and empirical strategy are discussed in Section 3, followed by Section 4 where econometric specifications are laid out and the estimates presented. Section 5 concludes.
Section 2: Background information and testable hypotheses
This section provides background information on China's stock market and listed firms, and develops hypotheses to be tested in the paper.
Two key features of China's stock market and main hypotheses
10 Wu (2003) makes a similar argument.
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The first feature Chinese listed firms have in common is the highly concentrated ownership structure. On average, the proportion of company stock owned by the largest shareholder is more than 44%, and over 42% of listed firms have a controlling shareholder owning more than half of the company stock. This degree of concentration is both a reflection of the state's reluctance to let go of its control of the former SOEs and a response of privately controlled firms to the weak protection for outside investors.
Concentration of both control and ownership of listed firms is prevalent in countries with weak protection for investors and is argued to be a rational response by private entrepreneurs to the lack of investor protection (La Porta et al. 2000) . Among other reasons for choosing such concentration, a larger stake in the company gives the controlling shareholder more incentives to monitor the management and thus leads to higher performance-turnover sensitivities. It is worth pointing out that the same argument applies to listed firms controlled by all types of shareholders.
Therefore, to the extent that the state cares about firm performance among other things, a higher concentration of state ownership presumably will also lead to more effective corporate governance measures such as a stronger link between firm performance and executive turnover.
Our first main hypothesis, therefore, is:
Hypothesis I: Sensitivities of CEO turnover to firm performance are higher for listed firms with greater proportion of the stock owned by the controlling shareholder.
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The above hypothesis applies to any country where investor protection is weak, be it China or Italy. Our second hypothesis, however, is unique to transitional economies like China, where the state ownership and control still loom large. The dominance of state ownership and control in China's listed firms is fundamentally due to the Chinese government's delay in privatization. Since their very beginning in the early 1990s, the stock exchanges in Shanghai and 7 Shenzhen were conceived and designed primarily to help SOEs raise capital and reduce debt burden, rather than serving as the channel for efficient resource allocation. To achieve the goal of raising funds for SOEs, until 2000 public listing has required quotas, which were reserved almost exclusively for SOEs. It is thus only natural that the vast majority of listed firms in China are spin-offs of SOEs.
Although the policy of "grasping the big and letting go of the small," adopted at the Chinese Communist Party's 15th Party Congress in 1997, vowed support for privatization of small SOEs and opened the door for ownership restructuring for large SOEs, the ownership restructuring of Chinese listed firms has been slow. 12 In 2003, the government still remains the largest shareholder in over 80% of the listed firms, either directly by owning state shares or indirectly by owning legal person shares, which together constitute about two thirds of the company stock of all listed firms.
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For the reasons discussed below, the dominance of state ownership will have negative implications for meaningful SOE reform and the further development of China's stock market. 12 The Chinese government has long been delaying the privatization process in its enterprise reforms until very recently. In the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese SOE reform measures were mainly designed to align the interests of SOE management with the interests of the government, and they include the administrative decentralization and profit retention policies (fangquan rangli) in the late 1970s to the early 1980s; the changes in the forms of profit sharing and funding sources for SOEs during the mid to late 1980s (ligaishui and bogaidai); and the incentive contracts for managers and workers during the late 1980s (chengbaozhi). For a detailed discussion on China's earlier enterprise reform from a historic perspective, see Naughton (1995) and Yang (1997) . Beginning in the early 1990s, increasingly bolder SOE reform measures were implemented. The Chinese Communist Party's (the CCP) 14 th Congress held in 1992 called for establishing a modern corporation system similar to the West spurred the stock market's rapid development in China since 1992. In contrast to the largely gradualist SOE reform measures adopted in the 1970s and 1980s, the CCP's 14 th Congress in October 1992 opened a new chapter in China's SOE reform by proposing more radical changes including corporate and ownership structure changes. Following the 14 th Congress, the National Peoples' Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee passed the Corporate Law in 1993, which laid out the essential rules for corporate governance in modern Chinese corporations and provided blueprints for later SOE reforms. The major breakthrough in terms of ownership changes occurred in 1997, when the Chinese Communist Party's 15th Party Congress made the shareholding system a showpiece of China's enterprise reform and public listing a main mechanism to attain the goal for large SOEs, and this led to a rapid increase in the number of firms listed in the two stock exchanges in China. The growth of the stock market was further aided by the passage of the Securities Law in 1998. For China's delay in privatizing its SOEs, see Huang (2003) . For a general discussion on enterprise reform in transition economies, see Megginson and Netter (2001) . 13 Unless noted otherwise, numbers cited in this paper are computed from the GTA and Sinofin data bases by the authors. For similar estimates for different types of share percentages, see, for instance, Qiang (2003).
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First, state ownership suffers from the separation between ownership by the general public and control by the bureaucrats in charge of the daily operations of the firm. Because the bureaucrats may have very different goals from the general public, there exists inherent conflict of interests between the owners and the management (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Secondly, even if the state is able to hold the bureaucrats accountable for implementing its goals in operating the stateowned firms, the multiple and oftentimes conflicting social objectives pursued by the state imply that the firm's economic performance often has to be sacrificed to achieve other "higher" social goals such as full employment. Furthermore, the state and legal person shares of Chinese listed firms held directly or indirectly by the government are non-tradable shares and any transfer of these stocks has to be approved by numerous government agencies including both the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance. This greatly weakens the market's disciplinary function through takeover since without the government's approval there is virtually no threat of an alternative management team that can offer a better return for the current firm's asset, no matter how unsatisfactory the firm's performance is.
All these facts lead to weak incentives for state owned firms to aggressively pursue profit maximization and increase the firm's market value. It is to be expected, therefore, that these firms will lack corporate governance measures that link firm performance with the fortune of the CEO.
14 In particular, they will not have strong link between firm performance and CEO turnover.
In addition, most of the firms controlled by the government still follow the same routine as SOEs in their top personnel decisions. Depending on the management level of the SOE, the government of the corresponding level has the authority to appoint its top management. For 14 For the negative impact on managerial incentives of these arrangements, see Bonin (1976 ), Weitzman (1976 , Kornai (1992) , Ickes and Samuelson (1987) , Litwack (1991), and Dewatripont and Roland (1997) . 
Other hypotheses: the role of CSRC and "insider" control
In addition to the two main features of China's stock market, we also consider three potentially important factors which may affect the quality of corporate governance in China: independent directors, insider CEOs, and ST-designation. The first and second factors speak to the prevalence of "insider" control and the severity of the second type of agency problem in Chinese listed firm. The third factor and the first are measures introduced by the CSRC to improve corporate governance in China.
10
First, in its effort to improve corporate governance in China, the biggest challenge faced by the CSRC is "insider" control. Although ownership concentration and the consequent "insider" control help reduce the principal-agent problem between owners and the management, particularly in countries with poor protection of outside investors, it also aggravates the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999) . 16 We develop two hypotheses concerning how well Chinese listed firms resolve the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and outside investors.
According to China's Corporate Law, the board of directors represents the interests of all the shareholders. But in reality, the board of directors in Chinese listed firms is often staffed with individuals that are directly or indirectly affiliated with the controlling shareholder, leaving small individual investors with no representation. 17 An average listed firm in China has about ten members on its board of directors, among which only two are independent directors in 2002, the year when the percentage is the highest in our sample.
Under such circumstances, one way to protect the interests of minority shareholders is to guarantee a minimum number of independent directors on the board who are not affiliated with either the controlling shareholder or the listed firm, but rather serve on behalf of the outside investors. The recent effort to improve the quality of corporate governance in China has followed this logic and the CSRC has introduced certain standard corporate governance measures borrowed from the West. 18 Notably, according to the "Guidelines for Establishing Independent The CSRC also states in the "Guidelines" and the "Corporate Governance Model Codes" that the board of directors should establish committees in charge of compensation, auditing, and nomination. In addition, at least half of the members serving on these committees should be independent directors and the chairs of these committees should also be served by independent directors.
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Given the prevalence of "insider" control in Chinese listed firms, independent directors who are truly independent of the controlling shareholders have the potential to substantially improve the quality of corporate governance. There exist, however, conflicting views on how effective independent directors are in improving corporate governance in China. According to recent newspaper coverage, increasingly independent directors have hired independent auditors to audit the books for the listed firm, while others have refused to acquiesce to decisions made by 19 According to the Guidelines, an individual need to meet the following conditions to be considered "independent": (i) Neither the individual nor his or her relatives (including spouses, parents, children, siblings, parents in law, sons and daughters in law, spouses of siblings, and siblings of spouses) work for the listed firm or its subsidiaries; (ii) the individual does not directly or indirectly own more than 1% of the stock of the listed firm; (iii) neither the individual nor his or her close relatives (including spouses, parents and children) are among the largest 10 shareholders of the listed firm; (iv) neither the individual or his or her close relatives work for a company that owns more than 5% of the stock of the listed firm; and (v) neither the individual nor his or her close relatives work for one of the largest 5 shareholder companies. 20 Another example of the reform measures is the separation of the CEO position from the board chairmanship. Though there is no clear stipulation in the Company Law or other laws in China, many Chinese scholars and policy makers have recommended the separation as a good corporate governance practice See, for instance, He (2004). Mr. Jiancheng He is the chair of SASAC's (State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission) supervisory board in charge of the largest SOEs. Since the majority of board members and management are both appointed by the largest shareholders, however, the board of directors is not truly independent of management in most listed firms in China, and the artificial separation of CEO and chairman may not be sufficient to achieve the real independence of the board. As expected, we find no discernable effect on turnoverperformance sensitivities of the separation of the CEO position from the board chairmanship (in contrast, Goyal and Park, 2002 find evidence on the beneficial effect of the separation of the CEO position from the board chairmanship for the U.S.). These and other unreported results are available from the corresponding author at tkato@mail.colgate.edu upon request. the management and the controlling shareholders of the listed firm. 21 On the other hand, independent directors till recently only had very limited rights in litigation, predicting low effectiveness in their presence. Both views, however, are based on anecdotal evidence, and we will provide rigorous econometric evidence on their validity. Our next hypothesis is, therefore:
Hypothesis III: The appointment of independent directors enhances turnover-performance sensitivities.
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Another manifestation of the prevalence of "insider" control is the close relationship the Since appointing one of its own executives to be the listed firm's CEO is the most direct way for the controlling shareholder to exert its control, the CEO is probably expected to serve the interests of the controlling shareholder firm more so than those of the listed firm. It follows that for CEOs holding executive positions in the controlling shareholder firms, the criteria for measuring the CEO's success may thus be linked more to his or her effectiveness in helping to enhancing the interests of the controlling shareholder rather than to his or her ability in 13 controlled listed firms, since the state has multiple goals in operating a firm, including providing social welfare and political stability, it has the incentive to transfer wealth from its controlled listed firm to help achieve these goals.
To the extent that such wealth transfer activities, i.e., "tunneling" activities, are more prevalent in firms in which CEOs pledge allegiance to the controlling shareholder and that the amount of "tunneling" is reflected negatively in the listed firm's performance, the link of CEO turnover to firm performance is expected to be weaker for these listed firms. 24 Our next hypothesis is therefore a story about the Chinese version of "management entrenchment": 14 their performance and rid themselves of ST labels. To achieve such goals, these firms will presumably strengthen the incentives faced by their CEOs.
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Hence, our last hypothesis is:
The ST designation will result in stronger performance-turnover ties for the STdesignated firms.
Section 3: Data and Measurement
Defining CEOs and CEO turnover in Chinese Firms
Many studies on executive turnover in the U.S. and other developed countries have focused on CEOs. 27 In China, however, CEO is a relatively new concept and only very recently some companies have started to use the title. Since Chinese firms have historically used "General Manager (zongjinli)" as the title for their top executives, one is tempted to focus on these General Managers. However, a few facts complicate the matter and suggest that the designation of "General Manager" as the top executive in China may not be always correct. First, the Corporate Law in China stipulates that the Chairman of the board of directors is the legal person representative of a listed firm (Corporate Law §3, 1993) . Second, the Chairman of the board of directors is appointed by the largest shareholder in the majority of listed firms in China. 28 Given the highly concentrated ownership structure of Chinese listed firms, the Chairman appointed by the largest shareholder tends to be powerful and is often involved in the company's daily decision-making even without holding the position of "General Manager" simultaneously. him/her the CEO. Otherwise we consider the General Manager (who is almost always on the firm's payroll) the CEO. In the few cases where payroll information is not available in the database, we search online sources for information on who is in charge of the company's daily operations (for instance, who is cited as the most powerful figure by the major newspapers).
When everything else fails, we rely on information from the previous and the following years to determine what position corresponds to CEO in a company.
The CSMAR database provides data on the starting year of each CEO's current term, with a typical term for CEOs being three years in China, but fails to supply the year in which he or she is first appointed to the CEO position. To obtain data on the total CEO tenure for those who serve more than a term from the CSMAR database, we supplement the CSMAR database with the annual reports of all listed firms.
The unit of observation in our analysis is the firm-year pair. We exclude from our analysis observations with CEOs who have not served for at least a full year at the CEO position, because the data only allow for annual performance measures and there is no meaningful annual performance measure to be linked to turnover probability of such CEOs with less than one year of experience. (1997) . One might argue that company control changes such as takeover may be caused by poor performance and thus should be considered. As in the case of prior studies, the data are not rich enough to distinguish such company control changes caused by poor firm performance from other changes. 33 In addition, we assign missing values to observations where CEOs departing their CEO positions yet still remaining on board of the directors since such departures may well be normal retirement. 34 Since we use lagged values in our subsequent regression analysis, our final sample time period is 1999-2002 rather than 1998-2002. 35 According to "Report on Chinese Entrepreneurs: Emergence and Development"(Zhongguo qiyejia chengzhang yu fazhan baogao), p27, by the Survey System for Chinese Entrepreneurs 2004, the average age of Chinese CEOs is 48 and the percentage of female CEOs is 4% in 2002. 36 The Survey on Chinese entrepreneurs reports that in 1998 the percentages of CEOs with tenure length between 1 and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years, between 11 and 15 years, between 16 and 20 years, and more than 20 years, to be 36%, 28.3%, 26.7%, 6.4%, and 2.6%, respectively. In the same survey conducted in 2000, the considering the short history of Chinese listed firms. 37 Compared to CEOs of listed firms in the U.S. and Japan, CEOs of Chinese listed firms are much younger and have shorter tenure, although the tenure for Chinese CEOs in general is similar to, if not longer than, that in the U.S.
and Japan.
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The average annual CEO turnover rate is 24%, substantially higher than the average CEO turnover rate reported for the U. 
Characteristics of Chinese Listed Firms
For ownership structure, we will separate the listed firms into state controlled firms and non-state controlled firms, using data on whether the "ultimate controller" of the listed firm is the state. The ownership structure data are collected by Sinofin, and with one exception, the definition of the "ultimate controller" is comparable to that used in the corporate governance literature at 10% threshold level. 39 The definition of the "ultimate controller" used in prior studies requires the firms in the middle layer of a control pyramid also be listed. But according to Liu, Sun, and Liu (2003) , the main mechanism of indirect control for Chinese listed firms is entrepreneurs reported an average of 1.6 turnovers for the top executives working in their firms during the previous 10 year period. 37 Data on educational attainment are unfortunately extremely limited and available only for a very small subsample of 89 observations. For the small subsample, we find that 71% of firms with CEOs having at least a bachelor's degree, a substantially higher percentage than that reported for Chinese CEOs in general (4%). The result, however, might be due to the very small sample size of selected individuals who report such information.
38 See for instance Kato and Rockel (1992) and Kaplan (1994) 40 To the best of our knowledge, this is the only publicly available data on the "ultimate controller" of Chinese listed firms. Liu and Sun (2005) traced the chain of control for 1105 listed firms and calculated the shareholdings for their ultimate controllers and thus have the best data on ownership structure. However, their ownership structure information goes only till 2001 and their data are yet to be made available publicly. 41 The remaining 6% are mostly owned by collective enterprises, non-profit organizations, or employee stock holding committees. imposed by the CSRC, our estimates on how the introduction of independent directors affects the quality of corporate governance will be less subject to endogeneity bias. 
Section 4: Econometric Specifications and Results
As is often done in the literature, we estimate CEO turnover-performance sensitivities by estimating a logit model. We begin with the standard benchmark model used in prior studies on 
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In addition, the literature often considers firm performance from both the current period as well as the previous period. 43 However, since 57% of the CEO departures in our sample occur in the first six months of the year, firm performance in the current year is likely to reflect the replacing CEO's job performance as much as it does the departing CEO's. Thus we use firm performance in the previous year.
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The control variables include a variety of dummy variables capturing the possible influence on CEO turnover of the CEO's age, gender, tenure as CEO, job title (general manager or chair/GM dual position), as well as firm size (measured by the logarithm of the firm's market value) 45 and time effects. Specifically we created 11 dummy variables capturing the (non-linear) impact on CEO turnover of his/her age; and 10 dummy variables gauging the (non-linear) effects 22 on CEO turnover of his/her tenure as CEO. 46 In addition, we also include dummy variables controlling for the possible impact on CEO turnover of our definitional differences in CEOs (i.e., whether the firm's CEO is identified as an individual serving both the General Manager position and the Chairmanship of the board; as an individual serving only the Chairmanship and on the firm's payroll; or as an individual serving only the General Manager position and on the firm's payroll.) To control for CEO's age and tenure is particularly important since we are unable to completely separate CEO turnover due to normal retirement from disciplinary turnover.
47 Table 2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (1). We find consistently for all specifications that the estimated coefficients on PERFORMANCE are negative (of the right sign) and statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. To examine the magnitude of the estimated turnover-performance sensitivities, we use the estimated coefficients on PERFORMANCE and calculate the predicted change in the probabilities of CEO departure when PERFORMANCE improves from the 25 th percentile to 75 th percentile. Note that in calculating the predicted CEO turnover probability, we assign the median value for size and the mode values for all the other characteristics including the age, gender, tenure, and position type (dual, chair, or general manager) of its CEO. Turnover-performance sensitivities in China's listed firms as a whole are rather modest. For example, an improvement of stock return from 25 th percentile to 75 th percentile will lead to a rather modest reduction in the turnover probability from 19 percent to 18 percent.
The rest of the estimated coefficients have predicted signs, although many are not statistically significant. Particularly noteworthy are the positive and statistically significant coefficients on Age (59-61) and Age (>=62), indicating that as compared to the omitted category 23 of Age (<35), CEOs over 59 years old are more likely to depart. Because mandatory retirement age in China is 60 for men (and 55 for women), these results confirm the importance of including age dummy variables to control for CEO turnover due to normal retirement. In addition, Table 2 shows that CEO turnover is less likely in larger firms (negative and significant estimated coefficients on SIZE). We now study the main hypotheses outlined in Section 2. To mitigate potential endogeneity in studying how various factors affect performance-turnover relationship, firm characteristics such as ownership structure, board structure, ST-designation, as well as whether its CEO is an insider CEO are measured in lagged values. To test Hypothesis I, we augment the benchmark model by SHARE (proportion of the stock owned by the largest shareholder) and an interaction term involving SHARE and PERFORMANCE:
(2) ln[Pr(TURNOVER)/1-Pr(TURNOVER)]= α + β 1 PERFORMANCE + β 2 SHARE + β 21 PERFORMANCE*SHARE + γZ + u.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term PERFORMANCE*SHARE will enable us to test Hypothesis I, or whether CEO turnover becomes more sensitive to firm performance as the controlling shareholder owns more share of the stock.
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Columns (1)- (5) of Table 3 present the maximum likelihood estimates of Equation (2).
The estimated coefficients on PERFORMANCE*SHARE are always negative (of the right sign) and almost always statistically significant (except when ΔROA is used as a performance measure, it is not quite significant yet close to significant at the 10 percent level). This is consistent with the incentive hypothesis under weak investor protection, or Hypothesis I. When the largest shareholder of the listed firm has a greater stake in the firm, it will monitor the CEO more carefully and make his/her fate more tied to firm performance.
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To examine the magnitude of the effect on turnover-performance sensitivities of SHARE, we compare the predicted probabilities of CEO departure for the following two cases. To test Hypothesis II, we further augment Equation (2), with PRIVATE and an interaction term involving PRIVATE and PERFORMANCE, where PRIVATE=1 if the firm's "ultimate controller" is a private individual or firm, 0 otherwise. Columns (6)- (10) in Table 2 present the logit estimates of such a further augmented turnover-performance model. First, insofar as economic performance is concerned, the estimated coefficient on PERFORMANCE*PRIVATE is negative (of the right sign) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, confirming our hypothesis that there is a higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity for listed firms with private individuals or firms as their ultimate controllers.
On the other hand, we find no statistically significant impact on turnover-performance sensitivities of PRIVATE when we substitute accounting measures for stock return (economic performance). A possible explanation is that listed firms with private individuals or firms as the 26 ultimate controllers rely more on stock market performance than accounting performance which tends to be more subject to management manipulation, especially in China.
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Reassuringly our earlier results on the effect on turnover-performance sensitivities of SHARE have changed little even if we add PRIVATE and PERFORMANCE*PRIVATE, pointing to the robustness of our evidence for Hypothesis I.
Finally, the estimated coefficient on PRIVATE is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level consistently for all specifications. All things equal, CEO will enjoy less job security in listed firms with private individuals or firms as the ultimate controllers.
The magnitude of the effect of private control can be demonstrated by comparing four distinct cases. The two opposite extreme cases include: (i) the firm with strong incentive for the largest shareholder to monitor its CEO due to a relatively large stake in the firm (SHARE=75 th percentile) and the ultimate controller of the firm is now private (PRIVATE=1); and (ii) the firm with weak incentive for the largest shareholder to monitor its CEO due to a relatively small stake in the firm (SHARE=25 th percentile) and the ultimate controller of the firm is still the state (PRIVATE=0). And the two intermediate cases include: (iii) the firm with weak incentive for the largest shareholder to monitor its CEO due to a relatively small stake in the firm (SHARE=25 th percentile) yet the ultimate controller of the firm is now private (PRIVATE=1); and (iv) the firm with strong incentive for the largest shareholder to monitor its CEO due to a relatively large stake in the firm (SHARE=75 th percentile) yet the ultimate controller of the firm is still the state (PRIVATE=0). Again, all other firm characteristics are assigned the same values, at their median or mode values.
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As expected, the case with SHARE=75 th percentile and PRIVATE=1 displays the most substantial reduction in the probability of CEO turnover from 0.37 to 0.24, following an improvement in stock performance from the 25 th percentile in the industry to the 75 th percentile.
In addition, the opposite case with SHARE=25 th percentile and PRIVATE=0 shows little reduction in the CEO turnover probability, following the same stock performance improvement.
The Table 4 summarizes the results. This measure has been effective to the extent that performance-turnover relationship is a reasonable indicator for the quality of corporate governance. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term involving PERFORMANCE and INDEPENDENT is negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level when stock return is used and at the 10 percent level when MARGIN is used (when we use the other three accounting measures, the estimated coefficients still have right sign yet not quite significant though fairly close to being significant at the 10 percent level). Overall, evidence tends to be consistent with Hypothesis III that independent directors will be conducive to strengthening CEO turnover-performance link.
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To illustrate the substantial magnitude of the impact on turnover-performance sensitivities of independent directors, we focus on a firm with the controlling shareholder being the state, which owns 37.4% of company stocks (the median level of SHARE). Using our logit estimates, we find that when there are no independent directors on the board of directors (INDEPENDENT=0), the change in firm performance leads to little change in the predicted probability of CEO turnover. When the proportion of independent directors is a third of the board members, however, the predicted turnover rate decreases considerably from 19% to 8%, following a performance improvement from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile of the industry-adjusted rate of return.
Finally, note that reassuringly our earlier results on SHARE and PRIVATE change little even if we consider INDEPENDENT, pointing to the robustness of our findings on the effects on turnover-performance sensitivities of SHARE and PRIVATE.
To exploit the panel nature of our data, we re-estimate the fully augmented model with SHARE, PRIVATE and INDEPENDENT, using random effects. Such random effect estimates are presented in Table 5 . As the table confirms, we find no discernable difference between our earlier estimates and the estimates with random effects, pointing to the further robustness of our results.
Testing the remaining two hypotheses, Hypotheses IV and V will require us to use substantial reduced samples, and hence we will revert to the most parsimonious specification, i.e., the benchmark model augmented with one additional variable and an interaction term involving the variable and PERFORMANCE at a time.
As discussed in Section 2.1, "insider" control is one of the biggest challenges in China's endeavor to improve its corporate governance, and insider-dominated boards of directors are a reflection of this phenomenon. This explains the utmost effort taken by the CSRC to increase the presence of independent directors and as shown above, the effort appears to be paying off. We now test Hypothesis IV to study another aspect of "insider" control, "insider" CEOs that simultaneously hold positions in the controlling shareholder company and the listed firm.
Because information for "insider" CEOs is only available after 2000, unfortunately the sample size decreased substantially when studying this aspect of "insider" control.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the benchmark model, Eq. (1), augmented by INSIDER CEO (=1 if CEO also works for the controlling shareholder, 0 otherwise) and PERFORMANCE*INSIDER CEO are presented in Columns 1-5 in Table 6 . As Column (1) demonstrates, we find a positive and statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) coefficient on PERFORMANCE* INSIDE CEO when we consider stock performance. As such, Hypothesis IV is supported insofar as stock performance is concerned. In other words, turnover-performance link is weaker when CEOs work for the largest shareholders. The results using accounting performance measures are unfortunately more mixed.
Again, we use the estimates to gauge the magnitude of the impact on turnover- Columns (6)- (10) of Table 6 present the logit estimates. When we use economic performance (or stock return), the estimated coefficient on PERFORMANCE*ST is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. ST-designation will result in stronger turnoverstock performance sensitivity. On the other hand, no such impact of ST-designation on turnoverperformance sensitivities is found when accounting performance measures are used. 54 The magnitude of the impact of ST-designation on turnover-performance sensitivities is found to be economically significant as well, with an improvement of industry-adjusted stock return from 25 th percentile to 75 th percentile resulting in a substantial drop in the predicted CEO turnover rate from 24 to 19 percent.
Section 5: Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied the link between firm performance and CEO turnover using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1999 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics.
Several patterns of the quality of corporate governance in China have emerged from our analysis.
First, there is substantial variation in how closely Chinese listed firms link turnover of their CEOs to their firm performance. Second, the evidence as a whole suggests that a broad program including more comprehensive investor protection is needed to improve corporate governance in China and privatization may be an important part of the program.
Specifically, even if a firm is listed in China's burgeoning stock markets, overall, CEO turnover-performance sensitivities are still not economically important (though statistically significant). However, the presence of a large controlling shareholder will enhance turnoverperformance sensitivities (and hence the quality of corporate governance). This is in support of the "law and finance" approach to corporate governance, which attributes inferior corporate governance to weak investor protection. Furthermore, consistent with the argument made in the transitional economy literature, privatization is found to raise turnover-stock performance sensitivities and thus improve corporate governance. Combining the above two findings implies that turnover-performance sensitivities are the greatest when a private firm or individual becomes a large controlling shareholder, at least when stock market performance is considered.
In terms of the CSRC's reform efforts to improve corporate governance in China, we have some encouraging news. Both the introduction of independent directors and the ST designation are found to boost the link between stock performance and CEO turnover and hence enhance the disciplinary functions of the stock market although we find little evidence on the 32 favorable effect of CSRC's reform measures on the link of CEO turnover to accounting performance measures.
Finally, although China's labor market for executives is still in its early stage of development, there is evidence that executive turnover has served as an effective mechanism to infuse new blood into the firm's management and turn a company's poor performance around (Xu, Zhu, and Lin 2005) . To further justify our focus on CEO turnover as a valid measure for the quality of corporate governance in China and hence ultimately the success of China's enterprise reform, we perform a simple mean-difference test of firm performance before and after CEO turnover. Table 7 ST-firms (1999 ST-firms ( -2002 , ST(=1 if firm i is an ST-firm in the current year) 0.35 0.48 0 276 Note: The data are based on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset of 634 listed firms over the time period of 1999-2002. All value variables are measured in RMB and adjusted for inflation using CPI (1995=100). All models include various dummy variables capturing the possible influences on CEO turnover of the CEO's job title (general manager, or chair/GM dual position and time effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) control for correlation and clustering at firm level. The data are based on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset of 634 listed firms over the time period of 1999-2002. All value variables are measured in RMB and adjusted for inflation using CPI (1995=100). All models include various dummy variables capturing the possible influences on CEO turnover of the CEO's age, gender, tenure as CEO, job title (general manager, or chair/GM dual position), as well as firm size (measured by the logarithm of the firm's market value) and time effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) control for correlation and clustering at firm level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% The data are based on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset of 634 listed firms over the time period of 1999-2002. All value variables are measured in RMB and adjusted for inflation using CPI (1995=100). All models include various dummy variables capturing the possible influences on CEO turnover of the CEO's age, gender, tenure as CEO, job title (general manager, or chair/GM dual position), as well as firm size (measured by the logarithm of the firm's market value) and time effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) control for correlation and clustering at firm level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% The data are based on a pooled cross-sectional time series dataset of 634 listed firms over the time period of 1999-2002. All value variables are measured in RMB and adjusted for inflation using CPI (1995=100). All models include various dummy variables capturing the possible influences on CEO turnover of the CEO's age, gender, tenure as CEO, job title (general manager, or chair/GM dual position), as well as firm size (measured by the logarithm of the firm's market value), time effects and random effects. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% (5), since information for "insider" CEOs is only available since 2000, we were able to use only observations after 2000. For Specifications (6)-(10), we excluded all firms which did not receive ST-designation over the time period of 1999-2002. All value variables are measured in RMB and adjusted for inflation using CPI (1995=100). All models include various dummy variables capturing the possible influences on CEO turnover of the CEO's age, gender, tenure as CEO, job title (general manager, or chair/GM dual position), as well as firm size (measured by the logarithm of the firm's market value) and time effects. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) control for correlation and clustering at firm level. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Note: The data are based on paired-performance data of 293 listed firms, which experienced CEO turnover over the time period of 2000-2001. Since all observations where the CEO has less than one year's tenure are excluded from our sample, each of these 293 firms experienced exactly one CEO turnover between 2000 and 2001. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
